基于Safety Case的岩洞处置库长期安全分析

    Long-Term Safety Analysis of Rock Cavern Disposal Repository Based on Safety Case

    • 摘要: 岩洞处置是国际公认的低、中水平放射性废物(LILW)最终处置的技术路线之一。本研究旨在引入国际原子能机构(IAEA)推荐的“安全全过程系统分析(Safety Case)”理念,将其应用于我国某花岗岩岩洞处置预选场址,量化评估多重屏障系统在关闭后100万年内的长期演化行为,识别关键风险要素,为场址选择、设计优化及监管审查提供技术支撑。首先,基于国际数据库并结合场址特性,建立本地化的特征-事件-过程(FEPs)筛选体系。其次,采用自上而下与自下而上相结合的方法,开发了包含正常演化、扰动、人为侵入及极端假设在内的综合场景框架。最后,采用ECOLEGO程序构建全系统核素迁移模型。模拟计算表明,在正常演化场景下,公众年有效剂量峰值仅为2.61×10−9 Sv(约出现在关闭后19.2万年),远低于GB 13600—2024规定的0.25 mSv限值,长期剂量主要由99Tc和129I贡献。当假设工程屏障在关闭时立即失效,其对百万年尺度的剂量峰值影响微弱,表明工程屏障主要在早期(小于500年)有效包容90Sr和137Cs等短寿命高活度核素。然而,在岩石圈存在快速通道的扰动场景(旁路场景)下,公众年有效剂量峰值跃升4个数量级(至7.61×10−5 Sv),峰值出现时间大幅提前至约625年,且高迁移性的14C成为绝对主导的核素。研究显示该花岗岩场址具备建设低中放废物岩洞处置设施的优良地质与水文条件。多重屏障系统呈现出“工程屏障保短期、地质屏障保长期”的跨时间尺度协同阻滞机制。花岗岩围岩的基质扩散与吸附作用是阻滞长寿命阴离子核素的核心防线。由于地质快速旁路是系统长期安全的最大潜在威胁,“避开并有效阻断快速水力联系通道”是未来岩洞处置工程选址与设计必须坚守的关键红线。

       

      Abstract: For low- and intermediate-level waste(LILW) containing long-lived radionuclides, rock cavern disposal in stable geological formations is an internationally recognized approach. However, compared to near-surface disposal, rock cavern disposal involves more complex hydrogeological environments and significantly longer time scales. Traditional single safety assessments struggle to fully demonstrate system robustness and address epistemic uncertainties. Therefore, this study aims to apply the “Safety Case” methodology recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) to a specific granite candidate site in China. The objective is to quantitatively evaluate the long-term evolutionary behavior of the multi-barrier system over a period of one million years post-closure, identify key risk factors, and provide scientific and technical support for site selection, barrier design optimization, and regulatory review. Researchers established a localized “features, events, and processes”(FEPs) screening system based on international databases and site-specific characteristics. Subsequently, the study developed a comprehensive scenario framework using a combination of top-down system failure analysis and bottom-up FEPs integration. This framework included normal evolution scenarios, disturbed scenarios(e.g., engineered barrier failure, geosphere bypass), human intrusion scenarios, and “what-if” extreme scenarios. Furthermore, the researchers constructed a system-level radionuclide migration model using the ECOLEGO code. To address the heterogeneity of the fractured granite medium, a “dual-continuum” conceptual model was applied. The quantitative simulations indicate that under the normal evolution scenario, the peak annual individual effective dose to the public is 2.61×10−9 Sv, which appears at approximately 192 000 years post-closure. This value remains far below the 0.25 mSv dose limit stipulated by the national standard GB 13600—2024. Long-lived nuclides, specifically 99Tc and 129I, act as the major contributors to the long-term dose. In disturbed scenarios where engineered barriers fail immediately upon closure, the impact on the million-year peak dose remains negligible. This indicates that engineered barriers primarily serve to contain high-activity, short-lived nuclides(such as 90Sr and 137Cs) during the early post-closure phase(less than 500 years). Conversely, the geosphere bypass scenario reveals a significant risk. If an undetected fast hydraulic pathway exists in the rock matrix, the peak annual effective dose surges by four orders of magnitude to 7.61×10−5 Sv, and the peak time shifts drastically forward to around 625 years. Under these bypass conditions, the highly mobile nuclide 14C becomes the absolute dominant contributor to public exposure. The study validates the long-term safety and suitability of the selected granite site for LILW rock cavern disposal. The multi-barrier system demonstrates a clear cross-timescale synergistic retardation mechanism, which translates to “engineered barriers ensure short-term safety, while geological barriers ensure long-term safety.” The matrix diffusion and physical-chemical adsorption mechanisms within the granite host rock serve as the absolute core defense line for retarding long-lived anionic radionuclides over geological timescales. Finally, the research highlights that undetected geological fast bypasses represent the greatest potential threat to the long-term safety of the disposal system. Consequently, avoiding and effectively blocking fast hydraulic pathways serves as a fundamental constraint and critical red line for future site selection, engineering design, and safety evaluation.

       

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